









Documentary credit - principle of autonomy – derogation 
 
Sirius International Insurance Co Ltd v FAI General Insurance 








This is an electronic version of an article published in the Journal of 
International Maritime Law, 9 (3). pp. 215-224, 2003, and is reprinted her with 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster 
aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience.  
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial private 
study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from within this 





Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 




In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail wattsn@wmin.ac.uk. 
DOCUMENTARY CREDIT ^ PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY ^ DEROGATION
Sirius International Insurance Co Ltd v FAI General Insurance
[2003] EWCACiv 470, English Court of Appeal, 4 April 2003
Facts
Agnew was a Lloyd's syndicate and had wished to reinsure its liabilities. FAI were proposed as the
reinsurers. Agnew was not happy with this and wanted a stronger reinsurer. Sirius agreed to act as
that reinsurer on the basis that FAIwould in turn reimburse them if they were calledupon to pay. As
consideration for fronting the arrangement, Sirius insisted on the issue of a letter of credit in their
favour. The agreement also provided that Sirius would not draw down under the letter of credit
unless:
(a) FAI had agreed that Sirius should pay a claim but had not put Sirius in funds, or
(b) the syndicate obtained a judgment or arbitration award against Sirius and Sirius was obliged to
pay.
In 2000, Sirius started an arbitration against FAI. In 2001,FAIwent into provisional liquidation and the
arbitrationwas stayed. In the course of proceedings,FAI acknowledged in aTomlin order that itowed
Sirius US$22.5million. Sirius contended that the terms of theTomlin order fulfilled the first condition
entitling it to draw on the letter of credit. Sirius then demanded payment under the letter of credit
andwas dulypaidby thebank.Themonies, for thepurposes of the dispute, were subsequentlyplaced
in an escrow account.
At first instance, Jacob J held that the conditionwas satisfied and FAI appealed against that decision.
Two issues were under appeal:
(a) whether the conditionwas indeed satisfied by the acknowledgement in theTomlin order, and,
(b) whether the letter of credit was autonomous to the extent that Sirius was entitled to draw on it
without reference to the arrangement between themselves and FAI.
Decision
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal ^ in respect of the first issue. It held that as a matter of
construction, the acknowledgement in theTomlin order by FAI that they were indebted to Sirius in
the sum of US$22.5 million was not also an agreement by FAI that Sirius should pay the syndicate's
claim as the condition required.
As to the second issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that the letter of credit
could not be drawn down by Sirius in contravention of their agreement with FAI. The court also
stated that although letters of credit were autonomous in the sense that the court would not
restrain payment where therewas a dispute under the underlying sale contract; in the present case
the terms agreedbetween theparties includedexpress contractualrestrictions on the circumstances
inwhich Sirius wouldbe entitled to drawon the letter of credit.To that extent, the court considered
that the letter of credit was thus less than the equivalent of cash and Sirius's security was
correspondingly restricted.
Comment
This decision is not entirely on secure grounds ^ as far as the point on the letter of credit is con-
cerned.The court referred to three reasons in justifying its decision that the principle of autonomy
might be derogated from (or did not apply) because of the unusual circumstances of the case:
(a) the contract in questionwas not a commercial transaction, like a contract of sale ^ whatwas in
issuewas an express agreement on the circumstances under which the letter of credit could be
drawn down;
(b) equity would have prevented the drawing down of the money (Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App
Cas 709, Insurance Co v Lloyd's Syndicate [1995] 1Lloyd's Rep 273);
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(c) it was clear that FAI had not only a seriously arguable case, but a positive judgment, that Sirius
was not entitled to drawon the letter of credit (Deutsche Ruckverischerung vWalbrook Insurance
[1995]WLR1017, per Phillips J at1030).
As regards the first reason, the court seems to take the view that in other letter of credit arrange-
ments, the underlying contract does not expressly prevent the drawing down of monies under the
letter of credit. May LJ seems to take the view that where there exists an express agreement
between the parties that the letter of credit's autonomy is to be limited thatwould reduce the letter
of credit's status as the equivalent of cash.May LJ said:
`Thepresentcase is inmore than one important respect a variant of themore typical.Here the relevant
underlying agreement is, not the commercial transaction that the letter of credit was intended to
support, as in the typical case the contract of sale or in the present case the retrocession treaties, but
a related agreement regulating as between FAI and Sirius terms onwhich the letter of credit would be
established.' (emphasis added)
The court went on to say that under such circumstances an injunction might be granted (although
that was academic in the present case because the bank had already paid out under the letter of
credit). It might be derived from the court's judgment that the principle of autonomy could be
derogated fromwhere there exists an express stipulation in the underlying contract as to when the
letter of credit couldbe drawn on. If thatwere the case, itwould amount to quite a devastating blow
on the principle of credit autonomy.Or is the court saying that such express stipulationsmay not be
insertedinto ordinary sale contracts, thuspreserving theprinciple in therealmof international sales?
That would surely fly in the face of the principle of party autonomy in international trade contracts.
The court built its rejection of the principle of autonomy in the present case on the premise that the
principle is not absolute ^ its sanctity, for example, will yield to fraud.The court saw no objection in
equity extending the exception to an express contractual proscriptionwhere the circumstances are
deemedunusual. It is unclear what the courtmeantby u`nusual' ^ itwould appear from the judgment
that as there was no underlying commercial transaction, the circumstances were unusual.What is
troubling iswhy (and towhat extent) theunusual circumstances of a case should affect the autonomy
of the letter of credit. The court's emphasis on the unusual arrangement does not take sufficient
account of the bank's role ^ how should a bank with or without notice of the u`nusual' circumstances
act, what about the position of correspondent banks which have negotiated the drafts drawn under
the letter of credit, etc?
The court had to justify its departure from the general rule by finding that theunusual circumstances
of the case meant that the commercial effectiveness of documentary credits had not been watered
down by its decision. It thus turned to Phillips J's dicta in Deutsche Ruckverischerung that no court
shouldgrant an injunction simply on the basis that the applicant had shown that therewas a seriously
arguable case that the claim under the underlying contract was invalid and stated that the circum-
stances in thepresentcasewere so decisive that therewasmore than amere seriously arguable case.
The Court of Appeal also confirmed the general view that themajority decision inThemehelp Limited
vWest [1996] QB 84 is questionable. Indeed, FAI's counsel was careful not to rely too strongly on it.
That case, it might be recalled, held that an injunction might be granted to restrain the beneficiary
from drawing on the performance guarantee where there was a seriously arguable prospect of the
applicant satisfying the court at trial that the only realistic inference to draw was that the sale con-
tract had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation.That case had no place in the present con-
text because as May LJ said, there was no allegation of fraud in the present case and it was not the
case that FAI (the applicant) hadundertaken that Sirius (thebeneficiary)wouldhave thebenefit of the
letter of creditunder the terms. In contrast,FAIhadplacedexpressrestrictions on Sirius'entitlement
to drawon the letter of credit.Themain difference as far as the courtwas concernedwas that in one
case, Themehelp, the applicant was purportedly acting in breach of his undertaking to ensure that
payment under the letter of credit would be made whilst in the other he was acting to prevent the
beneficiary to breach his undertaking not to seek payment under the letter of credit.On that basis,
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therewas no need to examine the validity of the granting of the injunction inThemehelp.Thus, as far
as the court was concerned, the cases were distinguishable. It is difficult to see how this distinction
renders it any easier for the court to deny the beneficiary from seeking payment under the letter of
credit when it was not entirely clear that there was a contractual prohibition against it. Indeed, the
very basis of the appeal was the fact that the court at first instance had held that Sirius had satisfied
the condition for paymentunder theretrocession agreements.Theprohibitionwasunclear ^ ithad to
bemade the subjectof judicial construction. Itwould seemrational to permit thepaynow, argue later
maxim to apply here.
It seems clear that the court had indeed extended the categories of exceptions to the principle of
autonomy. It is regrettable that the extension whilst doing justice to the parties in the present case
by placing the monies drawn down in the hands of the liquidators and not Sirius, has not been fully
considered as regards its general applicability and application.
JC
CARRIAGE OF GOODS ^ BILLS OF LADING ^ HAGUE RULES ^ DEVIATION ^
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Daewoo Heavy Industries Ltd v Klopriver Shipping Ltd
[2003] EWCACiv 451English Court of Appeal
Facts
The charterers of the Kapitan Petko Voivodo, a Bulgarian vessel, entered into a contract for the
carriage of 34 new excavators from Inchon in Korea to Istanbul. Six bills of lading were issued and
the contract was subject to Conline terms and also to a fax communication that specified carriage
u`nderdeck only'.None of the bills of lading stated that the excavators were stowed on deck.
The charterparty between the charterers and the owners was in the Gencon form.
The excavators were shipped in apparent good order and condition, and stowed and lashed under-
deck. After sailing from Inchon the vessel called at Xingang in China, where 26 of the excavators
were discharged from the vessel and restowed on deck. No notice or consent had been given or
obtained from cargo interests with regard to the restowage.
Thereafter the vessel sailed from Xingang for Zhangiang, and crossing theYellow Sea she encoun-
tered heavy weather. Eight of the excavators on deck broke free of their lashings and were lost
overboard. Other excavators stowed on deck suffered minor damage, including rusting and/or
wetting damage.
The Hague Rules did not operate in Korea, but had been enacted inTurkey. The Conline terms
contained a General Paramount Clause, the effect of which was that the Hague Rules as enacted in
Turkey applied.
Decision
The above facts were assumed for the purpose of determining preliminary legal questions, which,
stated succinctly, were to the following effect.Was the deck carriage in breach of the charterparty
and the bills of lading contracts? If so, acting on the assumptions that the breach was causative, or
causative together with (i) inadequate lashing, (ii) perils of the sea, or (iii) insufficiency of packing,
were the carriers entitled to rely on the limitation provision or any other defences under the Hague
Rules?
Therewasno doubt that the deckcarriage amounted to a breach of contract and therewas no appeal
on this question.
The question that survived for answerby theCourtofAppealwas, if the deckcarriagewas causative,
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The judgment also throws some light on certain aspects of insurance law. It is now confirmed by the
highest judicial authority that avoidance is the only legal remedy available under theMIA1906 in case
of breach of utmost good faith principles (a point previously confirmed by the Court of Appeal in
Banque Financie© re de la Cite¨ SA vWestgate Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1QB 665 and Bank of Nova Scotia v
Hellenic Mutual Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1QB 818). However, other
statutoryor common lawremedies couldbe at the disposal of the insurer in case of breach of utmost
good faith obligations at pre-contractual stage. It is now beyond doubt that the Misrepresentation
Act 1967 is applicable to insurance contracts and the insurer could be entitled to damages under
section 2(1) of this Act in cases where there is a negligentmisrepresentation.This is a matter which
has notbeen discussed in detail by courts, although inToomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co (No. 2) [1995] 2
Lloyd's Rep 88 Colman J assumed that the sub-section was applicable in the insurance context.The
samemust be true in cases where silence on the part of the assured amounts to misrepresentation.
On the other hand, the majority of the House of Lords refrained frommaking any conclusive state-
ments as to whether it is legally possible for the assured to contract that he should not be liable for
his agent's fraud.The truth of statement clause, upon its true construction adopted by themajority,
was not sufficient in the present case to relieve Chase of liability to avoidance of the contract or
damages in cases where the misrepresentation by its agents has been fraudulent, or avoidance in
cases where the non-disclosure has been dishonest. Based on this, their Lordships saw no reason to
evaluate any further whether there is a rule of law based on public policy which would prevent the
assured from excluding a remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation or non-disclosure by his agent.
There is no doubt that a person cannot be allowed to benefit from his own fraud or from the fraud
of his alter ego (Boyd& Forrest v Glasgow& SouthWestern RailwayCo1915 SC (HL) 20).Therefore, if an
exclusion clause upon its true construction purports to cover such fraud, it cannot, on public policy
grounds, be permitted to have that effect.However, it could be argued that, as long as the assured is
no way implicated the agent's fraud, there is no reason of public policy why he should not be able to
exclude his contractual liability for fraudulent non-disclosure or misrepresentation by his agent. By
the same token, there is no reason of public policy why parties should be unable by contract to
exclude a right of recession for fraudulentmisrepresentation or non-disclosure by an agent. It is also
worth noting that there is no judicial authority supporting such an extension of thepublic policyrule.
Even in the casewhichwasheavilyrelieduponby the insurers, SPearson&Son LtdvDublinCorporation
[1907] AC 351, Lord Loreburn LC, at 354, seemed to suggest that it could be legally possible to
exclude liability for the fraud of the agent:
I will not say that a man, himself innocent, may not under any circumstances, however peculiar, guard
himself by apt and express clauses from liability for the fraud of his own agents.
It shouldbeborne inmind that inhis dissenting judgment Lord Scott andRix LJ in theCourtofAppeal
held that public policy would come into play only where the agent's principal knew of, or was
otherwise complicit in, the fraud or where the agent was the alter ego of the principal, as an
executive directormaybe of his company. It is submitted that until the time the issue is reconsidered
by the judiciary, this should be regarded as the position under English law.
BS
COMMERCIAL AGENCY ^ NATIONAL LAW ^ PRIOR REGISTRATION ^
VALIDITY ^ COMMERCIAL AGENCY DIRECTIVE
Francesca Caprini v Conservatore Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura
(CCIAA)
European Court of Justice,Case C-485/01, 6 March 2003
Facts
Under Italian law, a register of commercial agents and representatives is maintained in which all
personswishing to pursue such an activity are obliged to apply for registration.Failure to do sowould
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result in a civil fine.Capriniwas notregistered in thatregister. She then applied to be listed in another
register, the register of undertakings, but that applicationwas rejected on the basis that shewas not
registered as a commercial agent under the former register. She challenged the validity of the Italian
law before theTribunale civile e penale di Trento. The tribunal decided to refer the matter to the
European Court of Justice.That question was whether the Directive on self employed commercial
agents precluded a rule of national law which makes the enrolment of a commercial agent in the
register of undertakings conditional on that agent's name having been entered in an appropriate
register.
Decision
The ECJ held that as long as non-registration in the register of undertakings didnot affect thevalidity
of an agency contract entered into between the agent and the principal or that the consequences of
non-registration did not adversely affect in any other way the protection which the directive has
conferred on commercial agents, the Italian law requiring registrationwould be valid.
Comment
The appeal was brought primarily on the back of an earlier ECJ decision (Case C-215/97 Bellone
[1998] ECR I-2191) that that Italian law, in its former guise, was invalid as it rendered all agency
contracts unlawfulwhere the agent concernedwas not enrolled in the register of commercial agents
and representatives. The directive states that whilst Member States are free to require that the
commercial agency contract should be expressed in writing, they are not to make the contract
subject to anyother formalrequirement. It is obvious that a requirement that the commercial agency
should be registered would constitute a formal requirement but it remains to be seen whether that
was a formal requirementwhich affected the legality of the contract.
In Bellone, the national law at issue in the main proceedings did not only require every commercial
agent to be entered on that register, but also made the validity of the agency contract conditional
upon such registration, with the result that an agent who was not registered was deprived of any
legal protection, in particular once the contract was terminated. In that respect it should be borne
inmind, first, that the Directive is designed to protect commercial agents, within themeaning of the
Directive. According to Article 1(2), a` commercial agent is a self-employed intermediary who has
continuing authority to negotiate the sale or the purchase of goods on behalf of another person . . .
or to negotiate and conclude such transactions on behalf of and in the name of that principal'. Since
entry in a register is not referred to as a condition for protection under the Directive, it follows that
protection under the Directive is not conditional upon entry in a register.
It is also important to note that the directive on self employed commercial agents was not only
intended to protect the commercial agent from exploitation by the principal following the
termination of the agency contractbut also to promote the freemovementof services and establish-
ment, as set out in Recitals1and 2 in the Preamble. In Bellone, although Italian practice appeared not
to apply the condition of entry in the register to foreign agents, the national provisions at issue in the
main proceedings, which were drafted in general terms, nevertheless also encompassed agency
relationships between parties established in different Member States. They were still capable of
significantly hindering the conclusion and operation of agency contracts between parties in different
Member States and therefore from thatpointof view alsowere contrary to the aims of theDirective.
That law was thus in breach of EU law.
This groundwas not relied on in Caprini; although Caprini argued that in the absence of registration
in the register of undertakings, Italian chambers of commercewould refuse to issue the certification
enabling commercial agents to comply with the fiscal and social regulations for the commencement
and proper conduct of their activity. It was further contended that an agent would not therefore be
able to performhis contract of agencymadewith his principalwithout that certification. As such the
Italian law was inconsistent with the provisions of the Directive.
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As far as the Advocate General was concerned,Caprini's argument was not sufficiently persuasive.
He was not convinced that it was clear that the consequences which Caprini described as flowing
fromnon-inclusion in the register of commercial agents, namely thatunregistered commercial agents
will be unable to obtain entry on the register of undertakings, with repercussions for the regulation
of their fiscal and social affairs, couldbe said to curtail theprotectionwhich theDirectiveprovides to
commercial agents in legal relations with their principals.
The ECJ, however, avoided deciding on the issue by relying on the principle of separation of powers
implicit in the preliminary reference procedure under article 234 ^ that is to say, the ECJ will only
offer guidance on the legal test but it is for the national tribunal to decide on the facts whether that
legal test wasmet.On that basis, itmerely stated the test to bewhether:
n`ational provisions such as those in issue in themain proceedings, which state that an agentwho is not
enrolled in the register of commercial agents andrepresentatives cannotbe registered in the register of
undertakings do not, according to the information providedby the national court, appear to affect the
validity of the agency contract or otherwise have a bearing on the relations between the parties to that
contract.'
It would then be the tribunal's duty to assess whether in the light of the specific circumstances the
Italian requirements did have a bearing on the validity of the agency contract.The ECJ in Bellonewas
prepared to inquire into the validity of the Italian law but not here.That course of action might be
explained awayon thebasis that in Bellone, itwas clear that the Italian lawprovidedpositively that the
commercial agencycontractmadewithoutregistration of the agentwasunlawfulwhilst in thepresent
case, that was not plainly obvious. It is not always clear when the ECJ in exercising its powers under
article 234wouldbeprepared to inquire into the circumstances of themainproceedings (CaseC-261/
81Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke v De Smedt PVBA [1982] ECR 3961; Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer
Wettbewerb eV v Clinique Laboratoires SNCet Estee Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994] ECR I-317).
Onbalance, the ECJ's approach is preferable ^ to the extent that the question of the full impactof the
Italian registration requirements is best tried by the Italian court which should have better knowl-
edge of the commercial and socio-political implications in Italy for anunregistered commercial agent.
JC
OIL POLLUTION ^ DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS
Alegrete Shipping Co Inc and another v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund1971
and others (The Sea Empress)
[2003] EWCACiv 65, English Court of Appeal
Facts
On 15 February 1996, the Liberian-registered tanker Sea Empress, laden with more than 130,000
tonnes of crude oil, ran agroundwhen entering Milford Heaven in south-west Wales; 72,000 tonnes
of crude oil were spilt, affecting some 200 km of theWelsh coastline.The oil spill resulted in several
statutory prohibition orders, prohibiting fishing, taking fish, or gathering or picking edible plants or
edible seaweed or fish in the designated area.The ban lasted for about six months.
One of many claims arising out of the incident was made byTilbury, which had a whelk-processing
business at Exmouth in Devon where it processed Welsh whelks for Korean buyers.Tilbury's case
was that the fishing ban brought an immediate end to the catching of Welsh whelks and destroyed
its business with the Koreanbuyers since itwas unable to replace the supply ofWelshwhelks.Tilbury
claimed for loss of profits in the sum of »647,557.
The shipowner's liability for any damage caused in the territory of the United Kingdom by contami-
nation resulting from the discharge or escape of oil under section153 of Schedule 4 to the Merchant
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